Babyfaces, trait inferences, and company evaluations in a public relations crisis by Johar, GV et al.
Title Babyfaces, trait inferences, and company evaluations in a publicrelations crisis
Author(s) Gorn, GJ; Jiang, Y; Johar, GV
Citation Journal Of Consumer Research, 2008, v. 35 n. 1, p. 36-49
Issued Date 2008
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/145665
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
36
 2008 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. ● Vol. 35 ● June 2008
All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2008/3501-0014$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/529533
Babyfaces, Trait Inferences, and Company
Evaluations in a Public Relations Crisis
GERALD J. GORN
YUWEI JIANG
GITA VENKATARAMANI JOHAR*
We investigate the effects of babyfaceness on the trustworthiness and judgments
of a company’s chief executive officer in a public relations crisis. Experiment 1
demonstrates boundary conditions for the babyfaceness-honesty trait inference
and its influence on company evaluations. Experiment 2 shows that trait inferences
of honesty are drawn spontaneously but are corrected in the presence of situational
evidence (a severe crisis) if cognitive resources are available. We demonstrate
that these babyface-trait associations underlie evaluations by reversing the baby-
face effect on judgments in (a) experiment 3, where a priming task creates as-
sociations counter to the typical babyface–unintentional harm stereotype, and (b)
experiment 4, which creates a situation where innocence is a liability.
Search the Web for today’s business news or read thebusiness section of the newspaper and you will likely
come across a headline about a company facing a public
relations (PR) crisis. Take the recent headline, “Edelman
Eats Humble Pie, Unmasked as Force behind Wal-Mart
Blog; PR Giant Does Damage Control” (Frazier 2006). The
accompanying article, which includes a photo of Richard
Edelman, contains Edelman’s apology for a fake blog that
his firm created on behalf of Wal-Mart. The question we
address is how consumers will respond to Edelman’s public
apology for the “error in failing to be transparent about the
identity of the two bloggers from the outset.” How will
Edelman’s apology influence consumer liking for the Ed-
elman and Wal-Mart brands? We believe that Edelman’s
photo in the news article—specifically, whether he is per-
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ceived to have a “babyface” (i.e., large eyes, small nose,
high forehead, and small chin) or a mature face—will be
one of the determinants of their response.
While prior research has documented the association of
babyfaceness with certain traits such as innocence, it has
neglected to pin down how these associations have down-
stream consequences. Further, the literature suggests that
the effects of babyfaceness are spontaneous but has not
empirically documented the spontaneity of this effect
or examined conditions under which this effect is cor-
rected by contextual cues. In four experiments set in a PR
crisis context, we investigate boundary conditions of the
effect of face type on the perceived credibility of a chief
executive officer (CEO) and, consequently, on company
evaluations. Our findings shed light on when and how the
face of a company spokesperson affects attitudes toward the
company.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Appearances bias impressions. Is the person attractive?
Is he or she tall? Does he or she have a babyface? Babyfaced
people are perceived as kinder, warmer, and physically
weaker than maturefaced people (Berry and McArthur 1985;
McArthur and Apatow 1983–84). They are also perceived
as more honest and more naive (Berry and Brownlow 1989;
Berry and McArthur 1985; McArthur and Apatow 1983–84).
It is generally accepted that associations between baby-
faceness and specific personality traits are chronic. All spe-
cies protect their young, so the babyface effect has its roots
in an adaptive function. However, the babyface stereotype
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reflects an overgeneralization beyond this adaptive function
(Zebrowitz 1997).
Friedman and Zebrowitz (1992) provide limited support
for the malleability of these chronic associations. Partici-
pants in one condition of their experiment were presented
with babyfaced males and maturefaced females to induce
associations counter to the stereotype (e.g., that males are
maturefaced). This gender–face type matching treatment
was, however, not successful in reversing chronic face
type–trait associations. Babyface associations were elimi-
nated for some traits and held for others.
Some research has examined the consequences of these
trait inferences. Babyfaced defendants are more likely to be
convicted of crimes of negligence, such as leaving some-
thing out on a tax return, rather than crimes of intention
(Zebrowitz and McDonald 1991). Crimes of negligence pre-
sumably reflect carelessness, a plausible babyface trait,
rather than dishonesty, which is not associated with baby-
faces. Zebrowitz, Tenenbaum, and Goldstein (1991) found
that babyfaced applicants were rated higher than mature-
faced ones for jobs that implied traits such as submissive-
ness and warmth in the job description. However, mature-
faced applicants were rated higher than babyfaced ones
when the job description implied traits such as dominance,
coldness, and shrewdness. In the only study that examined
the link among babyfaceness, trustworthiness, and persua-
sion, Brownlow (1992) found that the babyfaced spokes-
person produced more agreement with the message than the
maturefaced spokesperson when the spokesperson was con-
sidered to be untrustworthy.
With the exception of the few studies discussed above,
the focus of much of the babyface research has been on trait
inferences and not on the downstream consequences of these
inferences, such as evaluations and judgments (Zebrowitz
1997). In addition, while the finding that babyfaces evoke
specific trait inferences is fairly robust, prior research has
not systematically investigated the boundary conditions for
this effect. Further, it is not clear whether these inferences
are spontaneous and correctable in the face of competing
contextual cues. Exactly how these inferences influence sub-
sequent evaluations has also not been pinned down. Our
research contributes to the literature by addressing these
gaps. Examining boundary conditions as well as directly
manipulating associations enables us to predict when face-
based inferences of honesty and innocence influence sub-
sequent judgments positively versus negatively or not at all.
We elaborate on our contribution after discussing the context
for our experiments.
We examine a situation where a company has a product-
related PR crisis because it has released a drug in the mar-
ketplace that later turns out to have negative side effects.
This results in adverse publicity—a news report of the crisis,
which includes a photograph of the CEO. Press articles in-
cluding pictures of key players are common when such cri-
ses are first reported in the media, as in the Wal-Mart ex-
ample discussed in our opening paragraph. A question that
is very likely to arise in a reader’s mind when reading a
news item about the drug side-effects crisis is whether the
company knew about the problem beforehand but did not
acknowledge it publicly. One cue that might be used to
answer the question of intentional deception might be the
face of the CEO and how honest it looks. On the basis of
the literature discussed above, we expect that a babyfaced
CEO will be perceived as more honest and will produce
more-favorable company attitudes than his more mature-
faced counterpart. A babyfaced spokesperson who delivers
an apology during a corporate PR crisis is likely to be judged
to be more innocent of intentional harm than a maturefaced
one; by extension, the company should not be held to ac-
count for the transgression.
Past literature on facial shape does not speak to the con-
ditions under which this effect would hold. For example, if
consumers are alerted to other cues in the situation that are
more diagnostic regarding intentionality, appearance-based
inferences are likely to be corrected (Gilbert 1989). One
situational cue could be the severity of the crisis. As the
severity of the crisis heightens—for example, a drug has
side effects that affect a large number of users—the spon-
taneous inference that the babyfaced CEO did not inten-
tionally mislead is likely to be “corrected,” as long as cog-
nitive capacity is available. The maturefaced or babyfaced
CEO’s credibility will be low in such a serious crisis sit-
uation, and attitudes toward the company will likely be neg-
ative regardless of the shape of the CEO’s face.
Another gap in the literature concerns the lack of attention
to the role of face-trait associations in downstream judg-
ments. We address this issue experimentally through the
prior priming of associations either consistent with the baby-
face stereotype or counter to it, thus offering triangulating
evidence of the specific role of face-trait associations on
CEO and company judgments. We also examine this issue
by creating situations in which innocence has positive versus
negative implications. While the greater innocence of a
babyfaced person might be considered an advantage, the
same association could backfire in situations where inno-
cence is associated with naı¨vete´. A person who is naive is
less likely to be watchful, vigilant, and careful than a person
who is not naive, and he or she may therefore be too trusting
of others, even when such trust is not warranted. We take
the same construct of innocence and the associations related
to it to show how, in a PR crisis, perceptions of innocence
arising from babyfaceness can be either an advantage (a
situation where perceptions of a CEO’s honesty is of pri-
mary importance) or a disadvantage (a situation where per-
ceptions of a CEO being on guard/his or her watchfulness
is of primary importance).
The four experiments described above make the following
contributions. First, we demonstrate that trait inferences of
honesty are drawn spontaneously from babyfaceness, even
under constrained capacity conditions. This inference is cor-
rected in the presence of situational evidence (e.g., a severe
crisis) that renders it implausible; however, this correction
occurs only if cognitive resources are available. The fact
that these babyface-trait associations underlie evaluations is
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clearly demonstrated by reversing the effect of babyfaceness
on judgments in two ways: (a) creating associations that
are the opposite of the chronic association (babyfaceness–
honesty/innocence), and (b) creating a situation where in-
nocence is a liability and, hence, babyfaceness has a down-
side. Male faces are used to examine these effects in our
research since the babyface effect has been found to be more
pronounced for male than for female faces (Zebrowitz
1997).
EXPERIMENT 1: THE BABYFACE EFFECT
AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
This experiment tests the hypothesis that when the crisis
is not very severe, babyfaced CEOs will be perceived as
more credible than maturefaced CEOs, and attitudes toward
the babyfaced (vs. maturefaced) CEO’s company will be
more favorable. This effect will diminish as crisis severity
increases.
Method
The design is a 2 (face of CEO: babyface vs. mature
face)#3 (severity of the crisis: low vs. medium vs. high)
between-subjects design. The stimuli consist of a fictitious
Yahoo! news article about a pharmaceutical company, Bio-
medic, whose new product, Coughless, has been found to
have side effects (fig. 1). The article featured a photograph
of the CEO, who was either babyfaced or maturefaced, and
was titled “CEO Denies Knowledge of Side Effects.”
A single photo was used and was morphed into both a
babyface photo and a mature face photo with the use of
FaceFilter Studio software (see fig. 2 for photos used). On
the basis of the literature, we manipulated the eyes, eye-
brows, and chin of the person in the photo to make two
different versions (babyface vs. mature face).
A pilot study confirmed the difference in the perceived
babyfaceness of the person in the two photos. Eighty-nine
undergraduate students were randomly assigned to rate one
of the two target photos plus several filler photos on several
dimensions, using seven-point scales ranging from 1 (def-
initely no) to 7 (definitely yes). Two scales measured per-
ceived babyfaceness; one assessed how babyfaced the per-
son was, and the second assessed how maturefaced the
person was. A difference score was computed on the basis
of these two scales. Results revealed that the babyfaced
person was perceived to have more of a babyface than the
maturefaced person ( , respec-M’sp 1.68 vs.  2.62
tively; , ). Consistent with the lit-F(1, 87)p 4.54 p ! .05
erature, the babyface was seen as kinder (M’sp 4.70 vs.
; , ), more honest (3.74 F(1, 87)p 14.95 p ! .001 M’sp
; , ), and warmer4.30 vs. 3.45 F(1, 87)p 12.08 p ! .001
( ; , ) than theM’sp 4.94 vs. 3.71 F(1, 87)p 30.21 p ! .001
mature face. There were no differences between the two
faces in perceived age, expertise, and attractiveness.
Severity was manipulated by varying the percentage of
users (1% vs. 10% vs. 20%) who experienced side effects
while using Coughless. This manipulation was pretested us-
ing 24 participants who rated the seriousness of a number
of different potential side effects on a seven-point scale.
Participants rated the 1% case as significantly less serious
than the 10% case ( ;M’sp 2.54 vs. 4.00 F(1, 23) p
, ) and the 10% case as significantly less58.82 p ! .001
serious than the 20% case ( ;M’sp 4.00 vs. 4.83
, ).F(1, 23)p 38.26 p ! .001
Undergraduate students ( ) at a major universityNp 134
in Hong Kong participated in the experiment for course
credit and were randomly assigned to the various conditions.
They were told that the study examined people’s ability to
comprehend and evaluate online business articles. After
reading the article, participants reported their attitude toward
the company on three seven-point scales (from 1 to 7): bad-
good, unfavorable-favorable, and negative-positive (ap
). The next measure (five seven-point scales) related to0.94
subjects’ perceptions of the perceived honesty of the com-
pany’s CEO: not credible–credible, not sincere–sincere, not
honest–honest, not believable–believable, and not convinc-
ing–convincing ( ). Participants then responded toap 0.90
a seven-point manipulation check question ranging from 1
(he has a mature-looking face) to 7 (he has a babyface).
This was followed by two seven-point scales related to ex-
pertise ( ): (1) not very knowledgeable about busi-ap 0.88
ness to very knowledgeable about business and (2) very
inexperienced in business to very experienced in business.
None of the effects on expertise were significant.
Results
The manipulation check confirmed the success of the
babyfaceness manipulation. A 2 (babyfaceness)#3 (sev-
erity) ANOVA revealed only a main effect, with the baby-
faced CEO rated higher on babyfaceness ( ) thanMp 4.22
the maturefaced CEO ( ; ,Mp 3.30 F(1, 128)p 22.90 p !
)..001
A 2#3 ANOVA on company attitudes revealed the
expected significant interaction effect (see table 1;
, ). The main effects of face andF(2, 128)p 3.34 p ! .05
severity were both not significant. Contrasts showed that in
the 1% condition, participants had more-favorable attitudes
toward the company with a babyfaced CEO ( )Mp 3.56
than toward the one with a maturefaced CEO ( ;Mp 2.92
, ; one-tailed p levels are used forF(1, 128)p 4.49 p ! .05
all contrasts reported in this article). This face effect did not
significantly influence company attitudes in the 10% and
20% conditions.
The 2#3 ANOVA on perceived honesty revealed a
marginally significant interaction effect (see table 1;
, ). Both main effects were notF(2, 128)p 2.49 p ! .09
significant. In the low severity (1% side effects) condi-
tion, contrasts showed that participants rated the babyfaced
CEO as more honest than the maturefaced CEO (M’sp
, respectively; , ). An3.55 vs. 2.89 F(1, 128)p 4.47 p ! .05
ANCOVA confirmed that perceptions of honesty mediated
the effects of babyfaceness on company attitudes. The pre-
viously significant effect of babyfaceness on company at-
titudes was no longer significant when perceived honesty
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FIGURE 1
STIMULI USED IN EXPERIMENTS 1–3 (BABYFACED CEO–LOW SEVERITY CONDITION)
was inserted as a covariate ( , ; forF(1, 44)p 0.88 p 1 .35
the covariate, , ). The mean squareF(1, 44)p 16.64 p ! .001
for the face effect was reduced 84%.
The effect of having a babyface versus a mature face on
perceived honesty was marginal in the 10% condition
( , respectively; ,M’sp 3.68 vs. 3.20 F(1, 128)p 2.30 p 1
) and was not significant in the 20% condition. When.06
the means within the babyfaced condition were compared,
perceived honesty was not significantly different in the 1%
versus the 10% condition, suggesting that inferences of hon-
esty are drawn from a babyface unless strong situational
evidence (e.g., 20% of users experienced side effects) ren-
ders this judgment implausible (“the company must have
known”).
Discussion
When only 1% of users are minimally adversely affected
(e.g., by slight headaches), credibility of the denial of in-
tentional wrongdoing is greater for the babyfaced CEO than
for the maturefaced CEO. This appears to drive the more-
favorable attitudes to the company. The news article in this
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FIGURE 2
FACES USED IN EXPERIMENTS 1–3
TABLE 1
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1
Dependent variables
Crisis severity (% of users
getting headaches)
Low (1%) Medium (10%) High (20%)
Attitude toward the company:a
Babyface 3.56 (.88) 3.43 (1.04) 2.70 (.94)
Mature face 2.92 (1.19) 2.96 (1.14) 3.12 (.73)
CEO’s perceived honesty:b
Babyface 3.55 (1.04) 3.68 (1.35) 2.82 (1.09)
Mature face 2.89 (.98) 3.20 (.94) 3.13 (.98)
NOTE.—Values are given as means (standard deviations).
aAttitudes were assessed with three seven-point scales (bad-good, unfavorable-fa-
vorable, negative-positive), which were averaged.
bThe CEO’s perceived honesty was measured by five seven-point scales (not credi-
ble–credible, not sincere–sincere, not honest–honest, not believable–believable, not
convincing–convincing).
experiment concerned denial of wrongdoing by the CEO;
this presumably cued participants to think about the CEO’s
honesty. In the absence of other diagnostic cues to honesty,
face shape influenced the formation of these judgments,
which in turn influenced company attitudes. However, a
more serious situation (10% of users getting slight headaches
or, especially, 20% of users getting them) rendered a judg-
ment of CEO honesty less plausible. Participants appeared
to correct spontaneous inferences about the babyfaced
CEO’s honesty. Experiment 2 directly tests this posited
mechanism of correcting spontaneous inferences of CEO
trustworthiness.
EXPERIMENT 2: SPONTANEOUS
INFERENCE, DELIBERATE CORRECTION
This experiment manipulates cognitive capacity and tests
the hypothesis that the inference of trustworthiness is gen-
erated spontaneously on exposure to a babyfaced CEO. If
this is the case, the inference and subsequent evaluation of
the company should be more favorable when the CEO is
babyfaced versus maturefaced under constrained capacity
conditions, regardless of the severity of the crisis. However,
when cognitive capacity is available, the initial babyface-
trustworthiness inference should be corrected when the crisis
is severe, such that face has no effect on CEO and company
evaluations.
Method
Undergraduate students ( ) at a major universityNp 194
in Hong Kong participated in the experiment for course
credit and were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (face
of CEO: babyface vs. mature face)#2 (severity of the crisis:
low [1%] vs. high [20%])#2 (cognitive load: low vs. high)
between-subjects design. We predicted a three-way inter-
action, such that we replicate the two-way interaction be-
tween face and severity found in experiment 1 only in the
low cognitive load condition. We expect a main effect of
face in the high cognitive load condition where no correction
for severity of crisis is expected.
Participants were given the same cover story as in study
1 and were told that an additional objective was to inves-
tigate people’s numeric memory. To manipulate cognitive
load, they were given either a seven-digit number (high load
condition) or a one-digit number (low load condition) to
remember and were told that they needed to recall the as-
signed number at the end of the experiment (Zemborain and
Johar 2007).
Following these instructions, participants read the article
and completed the same company attitude ( ) andap 0.92
perceived CEO honesty measures ( ) as in exper-ap 0.88
iment 1. Participants were then asked to write down the
number they were assigned to remember. They were also
asked to recall the percentage of users who had experienced
side effects according to the article that they had read. Fi-
nally, participants responded to the face manipulation check.
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TABLE 2
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 2
Dependent variables
Crisis severity (% of users getting headaches)
Low cognitive load High cognitive load
Low (1%) High (20%) Low (1%) High (20%)
Attitude toward the company:a
Babyface 3.71 (.98) 2.92 (.95) 3.64 (.74) 3.76 (1.00)
Mature face 3.07 (.96) 3.08 (1.33) 3.18 (.81) 2.96 (.76)
CEO’s perceived honesty:b
Babyface 3.55 (1.02) 3.19 (1.03) 3.72 (.91) 3.72 (1.02)
Mature face 3.13 (.86) 3.35 (1.00) 3.22 (.75) 3.29 (.99)
NOTE.—Values are given as means (standard deviations).
aAttitudes were assessed with three seven-point scales (bad-good, unfavorable-favorable,neg-
ative-positive), which were averaged.
bThe CEO’s perceived honesty was measured by five seven-point scales (not credible–credible,
not sincere–sincere, not honest–honest, not believable–believable, convincing–convincing).
Results
A 2#2#2 ANOVA on babyfaceness revealed only the
expected main effect ( vs. ;M p 3.96 M p 3.53baby mature
, ). Memory of the assigned num-F(1, 186)p 4.28 p ! .05
ber, as measured by recall, was high and was similar across
conditions ( ). Results reported below cannotM 1 93%accuracy
be explained by a lack of attention to severity of the crisis
among those in the high cognitive load conditions. Partic-
ipants accurately recalled the percentage of users who ex-
perienced side effects in both high load ( )M p 85%accuracy
and low load ( ) conditions. Chi-square testsM p 91%accuracy
on the 2#2#2 design revealed neither interaction nor main
effects. The ANOVA results below remain unchanged when
participants who did not recall side effects correctly are
dropped from the analyses.
A 2#2#2 ANOVA on company attitudes revealed
the expected significant three-way interaction effect (see
table 2; , ). Further, participants hadF(1, 186)p 4.38 p ! .05
more-favorable attitudes toward the company with the baby-
faced CEO ( ) than the one with the maturefacedMp 3.51
CEO ( ; , ). The otherMp 3.07 F(1, 186)p 10.05 p ! .01
two main effects and all two-way interactions were not
significant.
In the low cognitive load condition, the two-way inter-
action between face and crisis severity found in experiment
1 was replicated ( , ). ParticipantsF(1, 186)p 4.23 p ! .05
had more-favorable attitudes toward the babyfaced CEO’s
company than the maturefaced CEO’s company in the 1%
condition ( ; ,M’sp 3.71 vs. 3.07 F(1, 186)p 5.21 p !
). In the 20% condition, the face effect was not signif-.05
icant. Under high cognitive load conditions, only the main
effect of face was significant ( vs.M p 3.70 M pbaby mature
; , ).3.07 F(1, 186)p 10.74 p ! .001
A 2#2#2 ANOVA on perceived honesty revealed a
similar pattern. Although the three-way interaction was not
significant ( , ), participants ratedF(1, 186)p 0.88 p 1 .35
the babyfaced CEO as more honest ( ) than theMp 3.55
maturefaced CEO ( ; , ).Mp 3.24 F(1, 186)p 4.82 p ! .05
The main effects of cognitive load and severity were not
significant. Examining the low cognitive load conditions
only, the two-way interaction between face and crisis se-
verity was not significant ( , ). De-F(1, 186)p 2.23 p ! .13
spite this, a contrast revealed that participants rated the
babyfaced CEO as more honest than the maturefaced CEO
in the 1% condition, although the effect was only marginal
( ; , ), but notM’sp 3.55 vs. 3.13 F(1, 186)p 2.16 p ! .08
in the 20% condition ( ). An ANCOVA confirmedp 1 .55
the mediational role of honesty in the relationship between
face and company attitudes. The previously significant effect
of babyfaceness on company attitudes in the 1% condition
was no longer significant when perceived honesty was in-
serted as a covariate ( , ; for the co-F(1, 185)p 2.58 p 1 .05
variate, , ). The mean square forF(1, 185)p 19.02 p ! .001
the face effect was reduced 65%.
In the high cognitive load condition, only the main effect
of face on honesty was significant ( vs.M p 3.72baby
; , ). The effect ofM p 3.25 F(1, 186)p 6.00 p ! .05mature
babyfaceness on company attitudes was attenuated, but
still significant, when perceived honesty was inserted as a
covariate ( , ; for the covariate,F(1, 185)p 4.77 p ! .03
, ). The mean square for the faceF(1, 185)p 14.37 p ! .001
effect was reduced 56%.
Discussion
Results reveal that babyface-honesty inferences occur un-
der limited cognitive capacity, even in high crisis situations,
and hence establish that babyface-honesty inferences are
spontaneous. Further, these inferences are corrected when
cognitive capacity is available. Inferences of CEO honesty
mediate the effects of babyfaceness on company evaluations.
In experiments 1 and 2, evidence that trait inferences un-
derlie company evaluations is based on mediation analyses
and hence is correlational. Experiment 3 manipulates the
face-honesty association experimentally and helps pin down
its role in the face–company evaluation relationship.
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EXPERIMENT 3: REVERSING THE
BABYFACE EFFECT
Given the default association of babyfaceness with hon-
esty, any transgression on the part of a babyfaced individual
is likely to be seen as unplanned and unintentional; dis-
honesty by contrast would represent a (deliberate) intention
to deceive (Sengupta, Dahl, and Gorn 2002). If the natural
association between babyface and unintentional wrongdoing
is reversed by creating associations between babyfaceness
and intentional harm, then the positive effect of babyface-
ness on company attitudes found in experiments 1 and 2
should diminish or even reverse. Priming participants with
the association of the babyfaced person doing intentional
harm and the maturefaced person doing unintentional harm
should result in similar or more-favorable attitudes for the
maturefaced CEO versus the babyfaced CEO. However,
priming participants with the more natural association of the
babyfaced person doing wrong unintentionally and the ma-
turefaced person doing wrong intentionally should replicate
the attitude results found in experiment 1 and in the low
cognitive load conditions of experiment 2.
Method
Undergraduate students ( ) were randomly as-Np 111
signed to one of the cells in the 2 (association conditions:
face type consistent association vs. face type inconsistent
association)#2 (face: babyface vs. mature face) between-
subjects design. Participants were told that they would be
taking part in several unrelated studies and completed some
studies before they performed the association task study,
followed by the Web article (used in experiments 1 and 2)
study. To manipulate associations between face and inten-
tionality, participants were given a questionnaire that was
purportedly a memory test. It contained pictures of six dif-
ferent anonymous “criminals” accompanied by a one-sen-
tence description of each of their offenses. To select the
pictures, pretest participants ( in total) were shownNp 137
several different male faces and were asked to rate them on
babyfaceness on a seven-point scale ( ,1p definitely no
). Three babyface pictures ( )7p definitely yes Mp 3.48
and three mature face pictures ( ) were selectedMp 2.45
for use in the association task ( ,F(1, 135)p 14.95 p !
)..001
A variety of pretests were done to select the intentional
and unintentional offenses. In the final one, 22 undergrad-
uate students were shown a list of different offenses, each
described in one sentence, and rated the intentionality of the
offense on a scale from 1 (not at all intentional) to 10 (very
intentional). Three “high intention” offenses (e.g., driving
at 150 kilometers per hour in a 30-kilometer-per-hour speed
zone) and three “low intention” offenses (e.g., driving at 96
kilometers per hour in a 90-kilometer-per-hour speed zone)
were selected for use in the association task (M’sp 8.32
, respectively; within-subjects, ,vs. 4.68 F(1, 21)p 43.78
). In the consistent (inconsistent) priming condition,p ! .001
three highly (less) intentional offenses were paired with
three mature faces, and three less (highly) intentional of-
fenses were paired with three babyfaces (see fig. 3).
In the main study, participants were given 5 minutes to
memorize the pictures of the people and their offenses. Then
after a 3-minute break, they were asked to match the picture
of the criminal with the described offense. (Only two people
made any mistakes, one in each condition.) After this “mem-
ory study” (actually the association task), participants did
exactly the same task as in the least serious (1% side effects)
condition in experiment 1. They then responded to the same
dependent variables as in experiment 1, along with three
additional measures related to intention to deceive (1p
, ; ): (1) whether orvery unlikely 7p very likely ap 0.71
not the CEO knew that the drug could cause headaches in
some users before it was put on the market, (2) whether he
felt guilty about what he did (reversed scored), and (3)
whether he was trying to cheat customers. The photos were
also rated on perceived attractiveness (1p not attractive
, ). Finally, participants respondedat all 7p very attractive
to a funnel debriefing questionnaire that probed for aware-
ness or suspicion concerning the association manipulation
(Chartrand and Bargh 1996). There was no indication that
any of the participants knew that the studies concerned the
effect of face shape. Also, none of the participants reported
that they thought there were links between these two studies.
Results
A 2#2 ANOVA on perceived babyfaceness revealed
only a significant main effect for face ( vs.M p 4.13baby
; , ), confirming theM p 3.47 F(1, 107)p 9.27 p ! .01mature
success of the manipulation.
A 2#2 ANOVA on company attitudes ( )ap 0.95
revealed a significant interaction effect (see table 3;
, ). No other effects were signifi-F(1, 107)p 7.24 p ! .01
cant. In the condition where consistent face type associations
were primed, attitudes were more favorable toward the com-
pany with the babyfaced CEO than with the maturefaced
CEO, as in experiment 1 and the low load condition of
experiment 2 ( ; ,M’sp 3.54 vs. 3.07 F(1, 107)p 3.16
). When participants were primed with inconsistentp ! .05
associations, attitudes were less favorable toward the com-
pany with the babyfaced CEO than with the maturefaced
CEO ( ; , ).M’sp 2.72 vs. 3.28 F(1, 107)p 4.10 p ! .05
This reversal in the pattern of attitudes provides strong evi-
dence of our proposition that the association between face
shape and honesty/unintentionality underlies the effect of
face on attitudes.
The pattern of results for perceived honesty ( )ap 0.91
was the same as that for company attitudes. A 2#2 ANOVA
revealed a significant interaction effect ( ,F(1, 107)p 9.13
). Participants primed with consistent associationsp ! .01
perceived the babyfaced CEO as more honest than the ma-
turefaced CEO ( ; ,M’sp 3.58 vs. 2.86 F(1, 107)p 5.62
). Participants primed with inconsistent associations,p ! .01
however, perceived the babyfaced CEO to be less honest
( ; , ).M’sp 2.90 vs. 3.52 F(1, 107)p 3.66 p ! .05
The interaction effect of face type and association con-
FIGURE 3
ASSOCIATION MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 3 (CONSISTENT ASSOCIATION CONDITION)
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TABLE 3
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 3
Dependent variables
Priming conditions
Consistent association
(baby–unintentional harm
and mature–intentional
harm)
Inconsistent association
(baby–intentional harm
and mature–unintentional
harm)
Attitude toward the company:a
Babyface 3.54 (1.16) 2.72 (.62)
Mature face 3.07 (.79) 3.28 (1.20)
Perceived honesty:b
Babyface 3.58 (1.08) 2.90 (1.17)
Mature face 2.86 (1.03) 3.52 (1.03)
Intention to deceive:c
Babyface 4.20 (1.21) 4.57 (.73)
Mature face 4.79 (1.09) 4.34 (1.07)
NOTE.—Values are given as means (standard deviations).
aAttitudes were assessed with three seven-point scales (bad-good, unfavorable-favorable, negative-
positive), which were averaged.
bThe CEO’s perceived honesty was measured by five seven-point scales (not credible–credible, not
sincere–sincere, not honest–honest, not believable–believable, not convincing–convincing).
cThe CEO’s intention to deceive was measured by three seven-point scales: (1) whether or not the
CEO knew that the drug could cause headaches in some users before it was put on the market, (2)
whether he felt guilty about what he did (reversed scored), and (3) whether he was trying to cheat customers
( , ).1p very unlikely 7p very likely
sistency on company evaluations was no longer significant
when perceived honesty was included as a covariate
( , ). The F-value for the covariateF(1, 106)p 1.41 p 1 .23
was significant as well ( , ). WhenF(1, 106)p 45.03 p ! .001
the consistent and inconsistent association groups were
looked at separately, the ANCOVA results revealed that face
type was no longer significant in both the consistent asso-
ciation group ( , ) and the inconsistentF(1, 54)p 0.31 p 1 .20
association group ( , ). The meanF(1, 51)p 1.27 p 1 .10
squares for the effect of face type on company attitudes
were reduced 93% and 79% in the consistent association
and inconsistent association groups, respectively. The co-
variate was significant in both the consistent association
group ( , ) and the inconsistent as-F(1, 54)p 21.19 p ! .001
sociation group ( , ).F(1, 51)p 23.52 p ! .001
Additional support for the mediating role of inferences
regarding honesty comes from the findings on the intention-
to-deceive measure, which revealed a significant interaction
effect of association consistency and face (F(1, 107)p
, ). Participants primed with consistent associ-4.03 p ! .05
ations rated the babyfaced CEO as having less of an inten-
tion to deceive than the maturefaced CEO (M’sp 4.20
; , ). Participants primedvs. 4.79 F(1, 107)p 4.43 p ! .05
with inconsistent associations did not differ in their intention
ratings for babyfaced versus maturefaced CEOs.
Discussion
Results of this experiment demonstrate that natural as-
sociations between babyfaceness and honesty/unintentional
wrongdoing underlie inferences about perceived honesty
and, hence, persuasion. We replicate the results of experi-
ment 1 when we prime the natural associations of baby-
faceness–unintentional wrongdoing and maturefaceness–
intentional wrongdoing and reverse the results when we
create the opposite associations. One could argue that in-
tentionality of the offense was confounded with offense se-
verity in the priming phase. Nevertheless, it is hard to see
how severity could account for the pattern of results ob-
tained, given that crisis severity was held to be low, at 1%
side effects in the main experiment. The results for honesty
provide reassurance regarding the role of intentions.
The findings in the reverse-association condition are es-
pecially powerful considering that different faces were used
in the association task and in the main experiment. Results
from the funnel debriefing reveal that participants were not
consciously aware that the association task and the company
attitude questionnaire were related and did not realize that
the study was about face shape.
To further examine whether the associations between face
shape and honesty are consciously accessible to participants,
15 participants were exposed to the consistent association
task, and 15 participants were exposed to the inconsistent
association task. After they had matched the faces with the
offenses, participants were asked to look at the sheet with
the photos and the offenses again and to write down the
purpose of the recognition study. None of the participants
wrote down anything about face shape or whether or not
the associations between faces and offenses were natural.
All associations were perceived to be plausible; yet the de-
fault associations, as numerous studies have shown, are of
babyface and honesty. These results support the notion that
links between babyfaceness and honesty are completely
unconscious.
In most priming studies, participants are primed with ex-
isting material in memory. In experiment 3, the inconsistent
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FIGURE 4
FACES USED IN EXPERIMENT 4
condition went beyond mere priming and created new as-
sociations in memory that were the opposite of associations
that participants had stored in memory. Our results are par-
ticularly striking given the potential barriers involved in
reversing associations in existing memory. Experiment 4
uses a different task to once again demonstrate that honesty-
related associations with babyfaceness drive judgments.
EXPERIMENT 4: THE DOWNSIDE OF
BABYFACENESS
Experiment 4 was conducted to show that the association
of babyface and innocence might have negative conse-
quences during a PR crisis if innocence implies naı¨vete´.
Innocent individuals may not themselves intentionally do
harm, but they may be prone to being taken advantage of
because they do not suspect others of doing harm. We use
this insight to design experiment 4, where we construct a
situation in which a company recovering from a PR crisis
is searching for a new CEO. We expect that a maturefaced
new CEO will be viewed as a better choice to lead the
company than a babyfaced CEO in the vigilance-in-doubt
scenario, whereas a babyfaced CEO will be viewed as a
better choice than the maturefaced CEO in the honesty-in-
doubt scenario.
Method
Undergraduate students ( ) at a large Hong KongNp 98
university participated in the study for course credit and
were randomly assigned to cells in a 2 (face: babyface vs.
mature face)#2 (scenario: honesty in doubt vs. vigilance
in doubt) between-subjects design. To test the robustness of
the babyface effects we found previously, we used a dif-
ferent pair of faces in experiment 4. As in the earlier ex-
periments, a photo was taken from the Internet and was
morphed into a babyfaced version and a maturefaced version
(see fig. 4). Using the same scales and procedure as in the
faces pretest in experiment 1, a pilot study ( ) con-Np 89
firmed the difference in the perceived babyfaceness of
the person in the two photos ( ;M’sp 1.06 vs.  1.74
, ). Consistent with the babyfaceF(1, 87)p 37.98 p ! .001
stereotype, the person in the babyfaced (vs. maturefaced)
photo was also perceived to be kinder (M’sp 4.17 vs.
; , ), more honest (2.93 F(1, 87)p 22.99 p ! .001 M’sp
; , ), and warmer4.34 vs. 3.36 F(1, 87)p 3.82 p ! .06
( ; , ). Per-M’sp 3.43 vs. 2.55 F(1, 87)p 11.63 p ! .001
ceived expertise did not differ.
The procedure was the same as in the previous experi-
ments. The article was different in this case and was titled
“Biomedic appoints new CEO.” The fictitious Yahoo! news
page contained both the article and a photo of the new CEO
(babyface or mature face across conditions). The content of
the article was manipulated to create two versions, an hon-
esty-in-doubt version and a vigilance-in-doubt version (see
the appendix). The honesty-in-doubt scenario focused on
the former CEO intentionally deceiving the company’s cus-
tomers; if babyfaces are associated with honesty, participants
should be more likely to prefer the babyfaced new CEO in
this condition. The vigilance-in-doubt scenario focused on
the naı¨vete´ of the former CEO; participants should be more
likely to prefer the maturefaced new CEO in this condition.
After reading the article, participants were asked whether
the new CEO was a good choice and whether the board had
picked the right CEO given the company’s current situation.
They responded on eight-point scales ( ,1p very unlikely
; ). Pretesting had revealed that,8p very likely ap 0.83
without any information about the characteristics or behav-
ior of the new CEO, participants just checked off the mid-
point if given the opportunity to do so. We used eight-point
scales without a midpoint in this study to increase the sen-
sitivity of the measures.
Participants then rated the likelihood of the new CEO
being honest and vigilant, each on three scales; honesty and
vigilance measures were counterbalanced across subjects.
The honesty questions assessed the extent to which the new
CEO would be honest with customers and not mislead them
if a drug in fact had side effects, and whether he could be
trusted ( , ; ).1p very unlikely 8p very likely ap 0.92
The vigilance questions assessed the extent to which he
would check the reports from the company scientists very
carefully, always be on his guard, and think everything
through before he made a decision ( ). Next, par-ap 0.88
ticipants responded to questions concerning their attitude
toward the company ( ). Finally, they rated the per-ap 0.94
ceived babyfaceness of the CEO and his attractiveness, in-
telligence, and knowledge.
Results
As confirmation of the success of the manipulation, a 2
(face: baby vs. mature)#2 (scenario: honesty in doubt vs.
vigilance in doubt) ANOVA on babyfaceness revealed a
significant main effect of face ( ;M’sp 5.57 vs. 3.69
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TABLE 4
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 4
Dependent variables
Scenario
Honesty
in doubt
Vigilance
in doubt
Evaluation of CEO choice:a
Babyface 4.87 (1.08) 3.83 (1.21)
Mature face 4.21 (1.16) 4.40 (1.10)
Honesty measures:b
Babyface 5.42 (1.57) 4.42 (1.16)
Mature face 4.69 (1.33) 4.49 (1.41)
Vigilance measures:c
Babyface 5.65 (1.29) 4.52 (1.41)
Mature face 6.05 (.93) 5.19 (1.10)
Attitude toward the company:d
Babyface 3.65 (1.04) 3.36 (.97)
Mature face 3.68 (1.05) 3.45 (.69)
NOTE.—Values are given as means (standard deviations).
aEvaluation of CEO choice was assessed with two eight-point
scales: (1) whether the new CEO was a good choice and (2) whether
the board had picked the right CEO given the company’s current
situation ( , ).1p very unlikely 8p very likely
bPerceived honesty was measured by three eight-point scales: (1)
whether the new CEO would be honest with customers, (2) whether
he would not mislead customers if a drug in fact had side effects,
and (3) whether he could be trusted ( ,1p very unlikely 8p very
).likely
cPerceived vigilance was measured by three eight-point scales: (1)
whether the new CEO would check the reports from the company
scientists very carefully, (2) whether he would always be on his guard,
and (3) whether he would think everything through before he made
a decision ( , ).1p very unlikely 8p very likely
dAttitudes were assessed with three seven-point scales (bad-good,
unfavorable-favorable, negative-positive), which were averaged.
, ). There were no differences be-F(1, 94)p 42.26 p ! .001
tween the babyfaced versus maturefaced new CEO in atti-
tude toward the company, perceived intelligence, perceived
attractiveness, and perceived knowledge. A posttest (Np
) showed that the babyfaced CEO was perceived to be30
slightly, but not significantly, younger (mean age 36.67
years) than the maturefaced CEO (mean age 38.80 years;
).F ! 1
The key dependent variable was the evaluation of the
new CEO. A 2#2 ANOVA revealed a significant interac-
tion effect (see table 4; , ) but noF(1, 94)p 7.18 p ! .01
significant main effect for either face or scenario. As ex-
pected, contrasts showed that participants in the honesty-in-
doubt condition evaluated the babyfaced CEO more favor-
ably ( ) than the maturefaced CEO ( ;Mp 4.87 Mp 4.21
, ). In the vigilance-in-doubt sce-F(1, 94)p 4.07 p ! .05
nario, participants evaluated the babyfaced CEO less fa-
vorably than the maturefaced CEO ( ;M’sp 3.83 vs. 4.40
, ).F(1, 94)p 3.14 p ! .05
An ANOVA on perceived honesty revealed only a
significant main effect of scenario ( ,F(1, 94)p 4.71 p !
). The honesty ratings of the new CEO were higher in.05
the honesty-in-doubt condition ( ) than in the vig-Mp 5.43
ilance-in-doubt condition ( ; ,Mp 4.46 F(1, 94)p 4.71
). Despite the lack of a significant interactionp ! .05
( , ), participants in the honesty-in-F(1, 94)p 2.41 p 1 .15
doubt condition perceived the babyfaced CEO as being more
honest ( ) than the maturefaced one ( ;Mp 5.42 Mp 4.69
, ). In the vigilance-in-doubt condi-F(1, 94)p 3.43 p ! .05
tion, perceptions of honesty were virtually identical for the
new babyfaced and maturefaced CEO (M’sp 4.42 vs.
; ).4.49 F ! 1
An ANOVA on perceived vigilance revealed a significant
main effect of scenario ( vs.M p 5.86 M phon.-doubt vigil.-doubt
; , ). There was a significant4.88 F(1, 94)p 17.14 p ! .001
face effect ( , ). The maturefacedF(1, 94)p 4.95 p ! .05
CEO was rated as more vigilant ( ) than the baby-Mp 5.62
faced one ( ). The interaction was not significantMp 5.09
( ). A contrast nevertheless showed that participants inF ! 1
the vigilance-in-doubt condition rated the maturefaced CEO
as more vigilant ( ) than the babyfaced CEOMp 5.19
( ; , ). In the honesty-in-Mp 4.52 F(1, 94)p 3.84 p ! .05
doubt condition, there was no difference in the vigilance
ratings of the babyfaced CEO and the maturefaced CEO.
Mediation tests were done in both the honesty-in-doubt
and vigilance-in-doubt conditions to test if perceived hon-
esty and perceived vigilance, respectively, mediated the ef-
fect of the new CEO’s face shape on evaluations of the new
CEO. When perceived honesty was inserted as a covariate
in the honesty-in-doubt condition, the previously significant
face effect was no longer significant ( ,F(1, 46)p 2.23 p 1
). The F for the covariate was significant (.14 F(1, 46)p
, ). The mean square for the face effect was5.52 p ! .05
reduced 51%. When perceived vigilance was inserted as a
covariate in the vigilance-in-doubt condition, the previ-
ously significant face effect was no longer significant
( , ). The F for the covariate was sig-F(1, 46)p 0.48 p 1 .49
nificant ( , ). The mean square forF(1, 46)p 31.34 p ! .001
the face effect was reduced 91%. Additional analyses
showed that the face effects on the evaluation of the new
CEO were not diminished when vigilance was used as the
covariate in the honesty-in-doubt condition (F(1, 46)p
, ) or when honesty was used as the covariate5.60 p ! .05
in the vigilance-in-doubt condition ( ,F(1, 46)p 4.20 p !
). These results argue against a sheer carry-over expla-.05
nation for the similar findings on the dependent variable and
the mediator.
Discussion
These results provide further evidence that the traits as-
sociated with babyfaceness are used in judgments. This time
it was judgments related to CEO choice rather than company
attitudes. In contexts where innocence has positive impli-
cations, a babyface is evaluated more favorably. However,
in contexts where innocence conveys naı¨vete´, a mature face
is evaluated more favorably. Not all positive traits are
equally desirable in all situations; for example, in an hon-
esty-in-doubt situation, honesty mediates judgments of a
prospective CEO. In the vigilance-in-doubt situation, vigi-
lance mediates judgments.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our research suggests that in PR crises the face of the
company matters. In four experiments, we find that what
might be considered surface characteristics, such as the
babyfaceness of a CEO, affect consumer judgments. This
particular facial characteristic affects the perception of a
CEO’s honesty/innocence and, hence, the credibility of the
denial of wrongdoing. Perceived credibility in turn affects
attitudes toward the company. Associations of honesty and
innocence with babyfaceness also affect judgments of trust-
worthiness and vigilance.
Our experiments concerned a product-related PR crisis.
The marketing literature has focused on “what” to say in a
crisis situation (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000)
and on attributions made from prior company evaluations
(Johar 1996). However, research has not had much to say
on the more “superficial” aspects of the response, such as
the face of the spokesperson. In experiments 1 and 2, we
demonstrate that when the company’s honesty is in doubt
and cues regarding intentions are absent, consumers are
likely to infer whether the company intended harm from the
face of the spokesperson. Consistent with the babyface lit-
erature, we find that consumers are likely to infer that baby-
faced CEOs have a lower intention to deceive than mature-
faced CEOs. However, situational cues, such as severe crises
that render this inference implausible, are used to correct
for the spontaneous inference of lower intentionality if cog-
nitive resources are available to facilitate this correction. If
sufficient capacity is not available, consumers will not make
this correction, supporting our position that the intentionality
inference based on babyfaceness is spontaneous. It is pos-
sible that severe crises reduce cognitive capacity by drawing
consumers’ cognitive resources away, toward the crisis, sug-
gesting that corrections for the babyface effect may not
occur in the real world in severe crisis situations.
Experiment 3 provides experimental support for the face-
honesty association playing a critical role in driving com-
pany evaluations. What is truly striking is that newly created
associations of babyface–intentional guilt resulted in the
babyfaced CEO being seen as less trustworthy and his com-
pany being judged less favorably as a result. Experiment 4
provided further evidence for the underlying associational
mechanism. Even more important, it demonstrated that the
characteristic of innocence associated with babyfaces can
have a potential downside. When a past CEO was suspected
of harming the company by a lack of vigilance, the ma-
turefaced CEO was the preferred choice for the new CEO.
As expected, when a past CEO was suspected of being less
than honest, the babyfaced CEO was the preferred choice
for the new CEO.
These results add to a growing body of research on the
mediational effects of inference making in the consumer
behavior literature (e.g., Johar, Sengupta, and Aaker 2005)
and establish that spontaneous inferences regarding person-
ality often drive judgments. The results of our research have
implications for any consumer situation where there are
trustworthiness and/or vigilance concerns and multiple play-
ers. There are instances in negotiations and sales, for ex-
ample, where consumers must evaluate the trustworthiness
of several players. Salespeople frequently try to appear as
if they are acting as the consumers’ advocate, trying to get
the best terms from a manager of the business. Since this
social theater requires the belief in a manager who is holding
back information and a salesperson who is transparent, po-
tentially the worst terms for consumers may result when the
salesperson has a babyface and the manager’s face is mature.
One feature of our research is that the insight we provide
into underlying processes is done through the use of different
operational procedures and different dependent and medi-
ating variables. A limitation of our findings must be ac-
knowledged. Across our experiments, the movements on the
dependent variables of interest occur mostly in the babyface
conditions. One could argue that severity of the crisis should
decrease company evaluations regardless of the CEO’s face;
however, this does not happen in the maturefaced condition.
One explanation for this lack of movement could be a floor
effect, such that company evaluations are low in crisis sit-
uations (regardless of crisis severity) when the CEO’s face
meets expectations (i.e., when it is mature). This could be
the default evaluation of a company in crisis.
Our research speaks to the general issue of automaticity
and thin-slice judgments. The process that underlies sub-
jects’ attitudes toward the company is undoubtedly a delib-
erative one. These attitudes are derivative and are based
on a conscious consideration of the attributes of the
CEO—attributes like trustworthiness and vigilance, which-
ever of the two is salient in the particular PR crisis the
company faces. While company attitudes may reflect a de-
liberative consideration of trustworthiness or wariness, the
link between judgments of these attributes and babyfaceness
of the CEO appears to be automatic.
From a broader perspective, it has been argued that a
person’s nonverbal behaviors (facial expressions, gestures,
movements, tone of voice, and so on) give a truer picture
of what they are really like than their verbal behavior does
(see Gladwell [2005] for discussions of this research). The
answer might lie in nonverbal behaviors being less con-
trollable than verbal behaviors and thus more indicative of
what people are really like. Nonverbal behaviors are, how-
ever, just one type of nonverbal cue (Gilbert and Krull 1988).
The physical characteristics of the person also offer non-
verbal cues that may be taken into account. Take the person’s
face and the particular characteristic we focus on in this
research—whether the person’s face has a babyfaced shape
or a maturefaced shape. It may be given undue weight in
interpersonal judgments because of the consistent, redun-
dant, and fixed feedback it provides, feedback that may be
especially difficult to ignore since the observer will typically
be unaware of its biasing influence. Ironically, the unchang-
ing and uncontrollable aspects of these characteristics may
increase confidence in judgments.
From the practical standpoint, a company has many issues
to consider when it is faced with a PR problem and how to
respond to it. Our research might be capable of informing
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it about one specific aspect regarding its response—the face
of the person it sends out to publicly address the problem.
We believe that not putting a face on the crisis is not an
option because the media are likely to feature someone from
the company in their reports of the PR crisis. Recognizing
this, the company can control whose face is put on the crisis.
When coupled with a long history of research in psychology,
our research suggests that the face shape of this person is
not a trivial consideration. It suggests that understanding the
nature of the crisis is the key to ensuring more-favorable
outcomes. Is the consumer likely to consider the problem
that gave rise to the PR crisis a problem of potential dis-
honesty on the part of the company or of a lack of vigilance?
Our recommendation: send out the babyface when the issue
is one of dishonesty and the mature face when it is one of
lack of vigilance.
APPENDIX
STIMULI USED IN EXPERIMENT 4
YAHOO! NEWS ARTICLE
First Two Paragraphs
Hong Kong (Reuters)—Biomedic Ltd, a Hong Kong
based pharmaceutical company, has named Frank Leung as
its president and CEO replacing the outgoing Henry Yip.
The change in leadership at Biomedic comes after Yip,
who led the company for six years, stepped down in July
after disappointing second quarter financial results, largely
due to the failure of their new cold remedy “Coughless”.
Soon after its introduction last winter, Coughless was found
to have a side effect—1% of users developed headaches.
The company and CEO Yip were severely criticized for not
mentioning possible headaches in the information sheet that
comes inside the box of Coughless tablets. A number of
consumers filed a lawsuit against the firm for intentional
deception.
Third Paragraph for Honesty-in-Doubt Scenario
According to the lawyer for the victims, “Henry must
have known the side effect before he put the Coughless on
market. This is one of the clearest cases of intentional de-
ception I have ever seen. Biomedic just wasn’t honest with
consumers and it should have been. This must not happen
again”, he emphasized. Whatever the outcome of the law-
suit, the publicity this issue has generated is likely the main
reason for the significant reduction in Biomedic’s sales and
profits this year.
Third Paragraph for Vigilance-in-Doubt Scenario
According to a company spokesman, “Henry should have
acted more responsibly. When our scientists said that the
results of their research showed that Coughless had no side
effects and was ready to go to market, Henry should have
insisted on more research—more tests and more complete
ones. They would have revealed the side effect of headaches.
Henry was too naı¨ve and took the scientists’ words at face
value. He did not check the facts thoroughly. This won’t
happen again”, he emphasized. Whatever the outcome of
the lawsuit, the publicity this issue has generated is likely
the main reason for the significant reduction in Biomedic’s
sales and profits this year.
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